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We present a simple neoclassical model to explore how an aggregate bank-capital 
requirement can be used as a macroeconomic policy tool and how this additional tool interacts 
with monetary policy. Aggregate bank-capital requirements should  be adjusted when the 
economy is hit by cost-push shocks but should not respond to demand shocks. Moreover, an 
optimal institutional structure is characterized as follows: First, monetary policy is delegated 
to an independent and conservative central banker. Second, setting aggregate bank-capital 
requirements is separated from monetary policy. 
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Modern economies usually operate in a corridor of stability, absorbing and smoothing
out shocks continuously. Sometimes, however, they leave this corridor and enter a
region of instability and crisis (see Leijonhufvud (1973)). The way in which economic
policy should deal with these two facets of an economy in the sphere of money and
banking has become a major issue in academia and policy-making.
According to pre-crisis consensus, monetary policy and banking regulation are respon-
sible for two dierent objectives. Monetary policy is executed by central banks and
focuses on stabilizing ination and output in the stability corridor of the economy.
Banking regulation aims at preventing the economy from leaving this corridor.
Monetary policy and banking regulation use dierent instruments. The central bank's
instrument is a short-term interest rate. While this instrument is perfectly sucient to
stabilize demand shocks, the stabilization of supply shocks, such as cost-push shocks,
involves a trade-o. In line with Tinbergen's rule (see Tinbergen (1952)), the central
bank cannot achieve two objectives, output and ination stabilization, perfectly if only
one instrument is available. This problem might be further aggravated if central banks
were also assigned a nancial-stability objective (see De Grauwe and Gros (2009)). The
most important instrument in banking regulation is a bank equity capital requirement.
However, this instrument is not varied in response to aggregate uctuations, so bank
regulation concentrates on the microeconomic and bank-specic level.
The situation is complicated by the fact that banking crises, during which the econ-
omy leaves the stability corridor, involve major output losses and thus aect the central
bank's objectives. Central banks play an important role in the management of a bank-
ing crisis by providing sucient liquidity. Accordingly, monetary policy and banking
regulation will necessarily interact.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we devise a simple model to study how
bank-capital requirements can be used as an additional tool for stabilizing the economy
and how this policy tool can and should interact with traditional monetary policy.1
1Kashyap et al. (2008) also argue for time-varying capital requirements.
2We show that bank-capital requirements should be relaxed when the economy is hit
by adverse supply shocks driving up ination and reducing output. On average, lower
capital requirements have a benecial eect on output but entail a slightly higher
probability of a banking crisis. Conversely, a supply shock that lowers ination and
increases output calls for stricter capital requirements in order to reduce the risk of a
banking crisis.
Second, we examine whether central banks should also be responsible for bank-capital
requirements or whether they should concentrate on monetary policy alone. Even in
the absence of a classic ination bias, it is optimal to delegate monetary policy to
a conservative central banker. A conservative central banker does not give in to the
temptation of output stabilization, which is ineective in our model and merely causes
socially harmful ination deviations from its socially optimal level. However, if the
conservative central banker were also responsible for the capital requirement, he would
opt for an ineciently high capital requirement, paying insucient attention to its
adverse impact on output. As a consequence, an optimal institutional structure requires
the separation of bank-capital policy from the central bank. While an independent
central bank is advantageous, our model provides no rationale for the creation of an
additional independent banking regulator.
2 Relation to the Literature
We propose a simple model of banking regulation and monetary policy with two
macroeconomic tools. The corresponding policy framework has been outlined in Gers-
bach (2011). To illustrate the potential working of both tools, we draw on three basic
insights from the banking literature.2
1. Banking crises are costly in terms of aggregate output.
The costs of banking crises are documented by Laeven and Valencia (2008).3
Output losses amount to 20% of GDP over the rst four years of the crisis and
2For an extensive account of nancial crises in history see Reinhart and Rogo (2009).
3Hoggarth et al. (2002) nd that cumulative output losses are as high as 15-20% of annual GDP
over the crisis period.
3can be as large as 98% of GDP. We will model these losses as a drop in natural
output. This drop can be the result either of a sharp decline in the bank supply of
loans or of medium-term tax increases necessary to nance the bail-out of banks.
2. Higher levels of bank equity tend to reduce the probability of banking crises.
A higher level of bank equity reduces incentives for excessive risk-taking and
improves the extent to which shocks can be absorbed, so it has a benign impact
on the stability of the banking sector. Moreover, debtors are more condent that
banks will be able to service their debt, which makes it easier for banks to roll
over their debt, thus reducing the risk of liquidity problems.
3. There are positive costs of high bank equity in terms of output.
Due to the \debt overhang" problem identied by Myers (1977), banks that have
to improve their equity ratio may be reluctant to raise new equity, although this
would be socially desirable, because they do not take the positive externality on
debt-holders into account. In this case, banks may cut back on lending, which
would be socially harmful and entail lower output (for a discussion see Hanson
et al. (2011)). In Gorton and Winton (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2000), and
van den Heuvel (2008), high levels of bank equity are socially costly because they
entail a reduction in banks' ability to create liquidity. Gersbach (2003) presents
a model in which non-nancial rms competing for equity face tighter credit
constraints when capital requirements are high.4
Our paper contributes to the discussion on the optimal institutional structure for bank-
ing supervision and monetary policy. Whether central banks should be responsible for
banking supervision is still a contentious issue. While central banks like the Bank of
England have been granted independence, they have also been stripped of their respon-
sibilities for banking supervision in return. However, the central bank's role as a lender
of last resort may make it necessary to invest it with some authority with regard to
bank supervision (see Goodhart (2002) for a review of these arguments). Peek et al.
4Admati et al. (2010) provide an extensive critical review of the arguments supporting the prevailing
view that high levels of bank equity involve social costs.
4(1999) provide evidence that information from banking supervision may be valuable for
the conduct of monetary policy. Adrian and Shin (2009) argue that monetary policy
and policies aiming at nancial stability are inseparable, notably because of the link
between short-term interest rates and the credit supply of nancial intermediaries.
Finally, our paper is related to the discussion on whether nancial stability should be
an additional goal for central banks. This has been argued by De Grauwe and Gros
(2009), who maintain that, at times, there is a tradeo between price stability and
nancial stability.5 Cecchetti et al. (2000) have insisted that central banks adjust their
instruments not only in response to their forecasts about future ination and the output
gap, but in response to asset prices as well (see also Borio and Lowe (2002)). Leaning
against asset price bubbles may reduce the probability of these bubbles occurring in the
rst place. However, the conventional wisdom summarized in Mishkin (2001) is that
monetary policy should only respond to asset price bubbles to the extent that bubbles
have an eect on output and ination through their impact on households' wealth
and thus consumption demand. First, it is inherently dicult for central banks to
identify bubbles. Second, raising interest rates in response to asset price bubbles may




The purpose of this exercise is to analyze how monetary policy interacts with equity
capital requirements in a simple model. Our starting point is a standard neoclassical
model in the tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
In its standard form, the model has been derived from microeconomic foundations
by Neiss (1999). To this model, we add equity capital of banks on an ad hoc basis.
Nevertheless this combination of banking regulation from a macroeconomic perspective
5Schwartz (1988) argued that price stability is conducive to nancial stability.
5and monetary policy can oer several insights and outlines several directions of future
inquiry.
First, our model is both analytically tractable and captures essential features of mon-
etary policy and banking regulation. In particular, we are careful about adding equity
capital and banking crises to the model in a way that is consistent with the existing
banking literature, as detailed in the previous section. Second, our model identies in
the simplest way the conicts of interest that may arise between bank-equity policies
and monetary policy. Third, it points to essential features that more elaborate and
fully-edged microfounded models of monetary policy and banking regulation should
capture.6
To sum up, we propose the simplest yet plausible aggregate model with the moderate
objective of studying monetary policy and nancial regulation as well as the optimal
institutional structure for both policies.
3.2 Set-up
The economy is populated by three actors: a central bank, a nancial regulator, and
the public. Demand is described by an IS curve:
y = y0   (i   
e) + ; (1)
where y denotes demand, y0 natural output, i the nominal interest rate,7 and e the
ination expectations of the public.8 Parameter  is strictly positive, and demand
is subject to a shock  with expected value 0 drawn from an otherwise arbitrary
distribution.
6However, one might also argue that general equilibrium analysis based on microeconomic founda-
tions, despite its numerous advantages (see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, pp. xxvi-xxvii)), may be
less appropriate to model times of banking crises than periods of relative economic tranquility. This
would be in line with the view that severe crises cannot be adequately described by markets cleared
by a Walrasian auctioneer (see Leijonhufvud (1981)).
7We have normalized the natural real rate of interest to zero, so i should be interpreted as the
dierence between the nominal interest rate and the natural real rate of interest. If the natural real
rate of interest were dierent in a banking crisis than in normal times, this would have no impact on
our ndings.
8An interesting future extension to our model would take into account the fact that the interest
rate may reach the zero lower bound in the event of a banking crisis.
6Supply is described by a Phillips curve
 = 
e + (y   y0) + "; (2)
where  denotes the rate of ination and  is a strictly positive parameter. The supply
shock " has an expected value of zero and a distribution function with nite support
[";"] (" < 0 < ").9
As a next step, we integrate capital requirements for banks into this otherwise com-
pletely standard model. As mentioned before, capital requirements have two eects
on our economy. First, higher capital requirements make banking crises less likely. To
model the relationship between capital requirements and the probability of a banking
crisis, we introduce the indicator variable , which is identical to one in the case of a
banking crisis and to zero otherwise. For simplicity, we assume a linear relationship
between the probability of a banking crisis and the capital requirement E:10
 =
(
0 with probability 1    + E
1 with probability    E
(3)
Parameter  (0 <  < 1) represents the probability of a banking crisis in the absence of
a capital requirement (E = 0). Parameter  ( > 0) describes how strongly an increase
in the capital requirement aects the probability of a banking crisis. The capital
requirement can be chosen from the interval [0;=] by the regulator. Henceforth we
will refer to an economy in a banking crisis as an economy in state B (bad). We will
use G (good) to describe a situation without a banking crisis. As is well-documented,
banking crises involve substantial output losses. We assume that a banking crisis causes
natural output to drop by  ( > 0).
Second, we assume that higher capital requirements also involve a social cost. More
specically, an increase in capital requirements leads to a proportional decrease in
9The assumption of nite support is made for analytical convenience. For appropriately chosen "
and ", the regulator will always choose an interior value for the capital requirement.
10We assume that all shocks are independent. One might argue that a supply shock that boosts
output but not ination will make banking crises more likely. This would not aect our ndings in
Section 4, because one would merely have to re-interpret the probability of a banking crisis in (3) as
the respective probability conditional on a particular realization of the supply shock.
7natural output, where the factor of proportionality is b (b > 0). According to these
considerations, natural output can be written in the following way:
y0 = y   bE   ; (4)
where y is the level of natural output without capital requirements and without a
banking crisis.
3.3 Loss functions
As is standard in the neoclassical framework, we assume that the social loss function
captures deviations of both ination and output from their socially optimal levels.
More specically, we adopt the following quadratic specication:
~ L = 
2 + ~ a(y   ~ y
)
2; (5)
where ~ a is the relative weight on output stabilization and ~ y is the output target.
Without loss of generality, we set ~ y to zero. As a consequence, output is measured in
terms of deviations from the socially optimal level. In order to study optimal delegation,
we allow for the possibility of the nancial regulator (denoted by subscript R) and the
central bank (without subscript) having dierent objective functions
L = 








with weights a;aR > 0 and output targets y and y
R. We do not make assumptions
on the signs of y and y
R. For example, y < 0 would imply that the central bank is
targeting an output level below the socially optimal level of output. In the tradition
of Rogo (1985), a benevolent government can delegate monetary policy and banking
supervision to authorities with objectives that are dierent from the social ones.
3.4 Sequence of events
We adopt the following assumption about the sequence of events:
81. Shocks " and  materialize.
2. The regulator chooses the capital requirement E.
3. The public forms its ination expectations e.
4. A banking crisis may occur. Then the economy is in state B, otherwise it is in
state G.
5. The central bank chooses the interest rate i.
A few comments are in order regarding this timing structure. Our aim is to capture the
eect that monetary policy can help to alleviate the consequences of a banking crisis.
Hence we place the stage in which nature determines whether a crisis will occur before
the central bank's move but after the formation of ination expectations. In addition,
we want to describe the consequences of banking regulation for risk-taking and thus
for the probability of a crisis. In line with this objective, the regulator moves before
nature decides on whether a crisis will occur. Shocks materialize in the initial stage
because we are out to describe the optimal response of the regulator to these shocks.
3.5 Parameter restrictions
We complete the description of our model by imposing three restrictions on the set of
admissible parameter values. These restrictions ensure that the regulator will choose
an interior solution of E. First, we require
b >
a + 22
a + 2 : (8)
This assumption ensures that the rst-order condition of the regulator's optimization
problem does indeed correspond to a minimum. Otherwise the regulator would either
choose the minimum level E = 0 or the maximum level E = =.
Condition (8) has the implication b > , which entails that expected natural output
conditional on E, which can be immediately derived from (4) as
y
e
0 = y   bE   (   E); (9)
9is a decreasing function of E. Hence, setting the regulatory equity requirement involves
a tradeo. A higher level of E leads to a lower probability of a banking crisis. At the
same time, it reduces the expected level of output.





























2 < (a + 
2)
2(b   )b; (11)
where we have introduced y








a2 + aR2 : (12)
Eectively, (10) represents an upper bound for y
av and thus also for y
R. This guarantees
that the regulator will not choose the corner solution E = 0 in order to boost expected
output as much as possible. By contrast, (11) imposes a lower bound on y
R. If y
R were
lower than this bound, then the regulator would strive for extreme safety and choose
the maximum possible value of E to eliminate the possibility of a banking crisis.11
4 Equilibrium
In Appendix A we show that optimal monetary policy, conditional on a particular value
of E, results in
Proposition 1






   y + bE +
a(   E)










   y + bE +
a(   E) + 2





11It is straightforward to show that for every admissible combination of the other parameters, the
set of y
av for which both (10) and (11) jointly hold is non-empty.
10In both cases, output, conditional on E, is given by
yG = y   bE  
a(   E)




yB = y   bE  
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E) + 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It is instructive to look at these ndings more closely. We focus on the impact of the
following factors on monetary policy: the demand shock , the shock to the Phillips
curve ", the level of equity E required by the regulator, the realization of the state B
or G, and parameter y of the central bank's loss function.
First, it is apparent that the demand shock  does not show up in equations (13)-(18).
This is plausible, as the central bank can perfectly stabilize demand shocks because
they do not involve a tradeo between output and ination stabilization. As a result,
the demand shock has an impact on the level of interest rates i but not on output and
ination.
Second, we discuss the impact of supply shock ". A positive realization drives up
ination and causes a decline in output for both cases B and G. This is completely
standard. It is worth mentioning that the central bank cannot dampen the eect of
shock " on output. Irrespective of the value of a, which represents the weight on
output stabilization in the central bank's loss function, the impact of " on y is given
by "=. This is a consequence of our assumption that the shock realization is known
when ination expectations are formed. Thus the central bank cannot deliver shock-
dependent deviations of ination from its expected value (  e), which would enable
it to moderate the shock. By contrast, the consequences of " on ination depend on
the size of a. This results from the central bank's futile attempts to moderate the
shock, which lead to a varying ination bias. From the point of view of minimizing
the uctuations of ination and output created by shock ", it would thus be optimal
11to delegate monetary policy to a conservative central bank that is indierent to the
stabilization of output (a = 0).
Third, we discuss the role of E. As we have seen, (8) guarantees that the expected
value of natural output y0 will be a decreasing function of E, as the harmful impact of
equity requirements on y0 is stronger in expected terms than the benecial eect arising
from declines in the probability of a banking crisis. This relationship is also reected
by Proposition 1, as yB, yG, and ye are decreasing in E. Because higher levels of E shift
output away from the central bank's target, the central bank has a stronger incentive
to boost output by increasing ination. The public sees through such attempts, which
are therefore unsuccessful in increasing output. But as a result ination is higher, the
stricter the capital requirement E is (it can be veried directly that the derivatives of
(13), (14), and (17) with respect to E are strictly positive).
Fourth, what is the impact of the realization of state B or G for a given level of E?
Comparing (15) and (16) reveals that output is lower in state B, which is an obvious
consequence of our assumption that a banking crisis leads to a drop in natural output
of size . Importantly, the dierence between yG and yB amounts to
2
a+2 and is
thus smaller than . Hence the central bank is successful in moderating the impact of
banking crises on output to some extent. This is an implication of our assumption that
ination expectations are formed prior to the stage where nature determines whether
a banking crisis will occur. As a result, the central bank can engineer a somewhat
higher than expected rate of ination in the event of a crisis, thus increasing output,
and somewhat lower ination in the absence of a crisis, thus entailing a decrease in
output. We conclude our discussion of states B and G by emphasizing the plausible
assertion that the dierence between output in the good state and the bad state is a
decreasing function of a. From the perspective of moderating the adverse consequences
of banking crises for output variance, a conservative central bank (a = 0) would thus
be detrimental.
Finally, we explore the relevance of the output target y for the outcomes of monetary
policy. In a neoclassical framework with rational expectations, the central bank cannot
12systematically increase output. This is reected by the fact that (15), (16), and (18)
are independent of y. By contrast, higher levels of y make it more attractive for
the central bank to attempt to increase output by inationary policy. This leads to
an ination bias. In line with these considerations, (13), (14), and (17) are increasing
functions of y.
Having outlined the optimal response of the central bank to shocks and the regulator's
choice, we turn in the next proposition to the capital requirement set by the regulator.
Proposition 2










where C1 and C2 are constants independent of y, y
av, and " with C1 > 0.
The proposition is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that the capital requirement E is unaected by demand shock .
This is intuitive, as the regulator anticipates that the central bank will neutralize this
shock's eect on output and ination. By contrast, the capital requirement is a negative
function of the Phillips curve shock ". A positive realization of the shock will tend to
reduce output, which will induce the regulator to relax capital requirements in order
to increase output in expected terms (compare (18)). On the downside, this also raises
the probability of a banking crisis.
Next we focus on some comparative statics. A higher output objective of the regulator
and thus a higher value of y
av results in lower capital requirements. In this case, the
regulator will be more inclined to take a higher risk of a crisis in exchange for a higher
average output level. By contrast, a rise in the maximum possible value y of natural
output will make the regulator more cautious in the sense of opting for a higher capital
requirement. If y is large so that output is high anyway, further increasing output by
relaxing capital requirements is less attractive. In addition, we observe that a higher
value of the central bank's output target y also entails a higher value of y
av and
13accordingly lower capital requirements. The negative relationship between the central
bank's output target and the regulator's choice of E can be explained in the following
way: If the central bank has a high output target, this will create large incentives for
the central bank to increase output by inationary policies. Obviously, this will not
lead to output gains but to high ination rates. The regulator anticipates this and
opts for loose capital requirements, which raise output on average and thus dampen
the central bank's incentives to choose high ination rates.
Finally, we note that parameters y
R and aR in the regulator's loss function only impact
on the equity requirement chosen by the regulator through their impact on y
av (see
(19)). Consequently, all combinations of y
R and aR leading to the same value of y
av are
observationally equivalent and above all involve the same levels of social welfare. In
particular, it would be possible to assume, without loss of generality, that the nancial
regulator only has an output target (aR ! 1). Then y
av = y
R would hold (see (12)).
Combining our ndings from Propositions 1 and 2, we can derive equilibrium ination
and output in the contingencies B and G and the respective levels expected at stage 3
of the game if the regulator chooses E optimally:
Corollary 1
In equilibrium, ination and output are given by
yG =










b(a + 2)   (a + 22)
;






























Four implications of this corollary are worth mentioning. First, an increase in y
R, which
is the regulator's output target, leads to higher output (yG, yB, and ye are increasing
in y
av and thus in y
R). Second, and somewhat surprisingly, output is decreasing in
y, which is the maximum possible level of natural output. An increase in y has two
14eects on output in our model. On the one hand, it increases output for a given
level of E. On the other, as explained in the discussion following Proposition 2, it
also raises the regulator's choice of E and thus reduces the average level of output.
On balance, the second eect is stronger, which explains the negative relationship
between equilibrium output and y. Third, it is instructive to consider simultaneous
increases of y, y, and y
R of the same size. Plausibly, this raises yG, yB, and ye by
the same amount, leaving ination constant. Fourth, and again surprisingly, a positive
realization of shock " increases output but lowers ination, which contrasts with the
behavior in Proposition 1, where, for a given level of E, a positive shock leads to lower
output and higher ination. The intuition for this nding is related to the one given
for the negative relationship between output and y, as the eect of an increase in " is
analogous to a decrease in y, which can be conrmed from Proposition 1.
5 Optimal Delegation
In this section we analyze two questions about optimal delegation and the optimal
institutional structure for central banking and banking supervision. We take the per-
spective that policies can be delegated to independent bodies whose objectives can be
determined either by the selection of a policy-maker with appropriate preferences from
a pool of candidates12 or by incentive contracts (see Walsh (1995)).
First, we examine whether a single authority or two dierent bodies should be re-
sponsible for monetary policy and bank-equity policy. We show that, in an optimal
institutional structure, bank-equity policy is separated from central banking. Second,
the previous nding raises the follow-up question of whether it is advantageous to as-
sign bank-equity policy to an additional independent authority or to leave it under
the auspices of elected politicians. We demonstrate that the creation of an additional
independent authority for banking regulation involves no benets for society.
We start with the comparison of two scenarios, one with separate bodies responsible
for the two policy tools considered in this paper, the other with a single authority.
12The literature on delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central banker goes back to
Rogo (1985).
15In the rst case, we assume that the central bank and the banking regulator have
loss functions characterized by dierent parameters, all of which are chosen optimally
from a perspective of ex-ante welfare. In the second case, both policies are assigned
to a single authority whose preferences are described by a loss function with optimally
chosen parameters. Formally, optimal delegation corresponds to the determination of
optimal values for a, aR, y, and y
R. In the scenario in which a single authority is
responsible for both policies, the optimal values are chosen subject to the additional
restrictions a = aR and y = y
R.
By construction, delegation to a single authority can never yield superior values of
welfare. However, we have observed that all combinations of aR and y
R that result in
the same value of y
av (see (12)) lead to equivalent levels of welfare. This exibility in
choosing aR and y
R makes it plausible that delegation to a single authority may not
involve welfare losses. In Appendix B, we show that this conjecture is incorrect.
Proposition 3
Delegating monetary policy and bank-equity policy to a single authority is strictly
inferior to the delegation of these policies to two dierent bodies.
Intuitively, it is optimal to appoint a conservative central banker in our model. Even
in the absence of a classic ination bias, a conservative central banker is less tempted
to stabilize the impact of supply shocks " on output. These attempts are ultimately
futile because shock " is known when the public forms its expectations about ination.
However, they lead to a high variance of ination and are therefore socially costly. So
while it is benecial to make a conservative central banker responsible for monetary
policy, it is socially costly to endow this conservative central banker with the additional
task of choosing capital requirements because he would choose too restrictive a value
of E.
As a next step, we ask whether delegation of banking regulation to a separate authority
is advantageous. To address this question, we examine whether the optimal choice of
a, aR, y, and y
R is consistent with aR = ~ a and y
R = 0. This is indeed the case.
16Proposition 4
The optimal institutional structure does not require delegating banking regulation to
an independent authority whose preferences dier from those compatible with social
welfare.
The proof is given in Appendix C. The proposition conrms our previous claim that it is
not optimal to let a conservative central banker decide on equity-capital requirements.
While a multitude of combinations of aR and y
R would entail the optimal value of y
av,
one solution is aR = ~ a and y
R = 0, in which case the banking regulator shares society's
preferences.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a model with two policy instruments: a conventional
short-term interest-rate and an aggregate equity requirement for the banking sector.
First, we have shown how both instruments can be used in the event of shocks. In
particular, a supply shock that reduces output and increases ination requires lower
capital requirements, which on average have a benign eect on output but increase
the risk of a banking crisis. Conversely, a shock that boosts output and lowers ina-
tion induces stricter capital requirements. Second, we have characterized the optimal
institutional structure for monetary policy and banking regulation. In this optimal
structure, the power to set the aggregate equity requirement has to be separated from
monetary policy. Moreover, while it is advantageous to delegate monetary policy to
an independent central bank, our model provides no rationale for the delegation of the
equity capital tool to an independent authority.
17A Derivation of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium in our economy can be derived by backward induction. First, we
derive the central bank's optimal monetary policy. Second, we compute the public's
ination expectations. Finally, we determine the optimal capital requirement set by
the regulator.
1. The central bank's optimal choice of i: As (1) is a one-to-one relationship between
i and y for given e, , and y0, the central bank can achieve any value of y by
selecting the appropriate value of i. Thus the central bank's optimization problem
is equivalent to a minimization of (6) with respect to y, subject to (2). This yields




+ 2a(y   y
) = 2 + 2a(y   y
); (20)
where we have utilized d
dy = , which follows from (2). Using (2) again to replace




a + 2  (
e + (y
   y0) + ") (21)
We observe that  does not appear in this equation. This is a consequence of the
fact that demand shocks can be perfectly stabilized by the central bank.
2. Derivation of ination expectations: Next we compute the public's ination ex-
pectations as a function of " and E. For this purpose, we note that the public
expects natural output y0 to amount to
y
e
0 = y   bE   (   E); (22)
which relies on (4) and the observation that the indicator variable , which is one
for a banking crisis and zero otherwise, has an expected value of   E. Taking








0) + "); (23)
18Replacing ye












3. Derivation of the optimal value of E for a given realization of ": To determine the
optimal equity requirement as a function of the supply shock ", a few preliminary
steps are necessary. First, we determine ination for the two dierent realizations










a(   E) + 2
a + 2 

: (25)
We introduce subscript B for a bad realization of , i.e. a banking crisis ( = 1),
and G for a good realization, where there is no banking crisis ( = 0). Evaluating























a(   E) + 2
a + 2 

(27)
Output can be determined by solving (2) for y and inserting (4), (24), and (25):




a(   E) + 2
a + 2  (28)
The good and bad realizations of output yG and yB correspond to (28) for  = 0
and  = 1:





a + 2  (29)




a(   E) + 2
a + 2  (30)
Because the expected value of  is    E, (28) implies the expression for ye
given in (18). After these preliminary steps, we can formulate the regulator's






















19where we have taken into account that the good state occurs with probability 1 
+E and the bad one with probability  E. It is tedious but straightforward












(a + 2)2(b   )





(a + 22)a + 1
24
2   b(a + 2)2
((a + 2)b   a)((a + 2)b   (a + 22))
; (34)







a2 + aR2 : (35)
We also have to check the second-order condition to conrm that the value of
E stated in (32) corresponds to a minimum of the regulator's expected losses.
It is again tedious but not dicult to verify that the second derivative of the
regulator's expected losses amounts to
((a + 2)b   a)((a + 2)b   (a + 22))(a2 + aR2)
2(a + 2)2 : (36)
Assumption (8) guarantees that this expression is positive. Finally, we have to
check whether (32) represents an interior solution for some support of ", i.e. some
combination of " and ". This is the case if two assumptions are fullled. First,
E > 0 must hold for " = 0, which is equivalent to
(a + 
2)












2 > b(a + 
2)
2; (37)
where we have used Assumption (8). Inequality (37) is identical to Assump-
tion (10).
13The attentive reader may wonder why there is only one solution to the rst-order condition. In
each case, B and G, the regulators' loss function is quadratic in E. Moreover, the probability of B
or G occurring is linear in E. This suggests that the regulator's expected losses are a polynomial of
degree three. However, the terms in the regulator's expected losses of the order E3 cancel each other
out. As a result, the minimand in (31) is quadratic in E and a unique extremum obtains.
20Second, we must ensure that E does not exceed its maximum possible value =,
which implies that the probability of a banking crisis is zero. Inserting (32) into
E < = and re-arranging yields
(a + 
2)



























Assumption (11) guarantees that this requirement holds, as can be readily shown.

B Proof of Proposition 3
In order to consider the optimal choices of a, aR, y, and y
R, we derive expected social
losses (see (5)) from (13)-(16), (19), and the facts that the probability of state B is
 E and the probability of state G is 1 +E. This gives expected social losses as
a function of a, y, and y
av. Because the respective expression is unwieldy, we refrain
from stating it here. The rst-order condition with regard to y






a2 + ~ a2 (39)
Recall that y






a2 + aR2 : (40)
Suppose that optimal delegation were possible with y





As a result, we obtain a contradiction because according to (39) y
av 6= y. Therefore
optimal delegation always requires y 6= y
R.14 
14Numerical examples are available on request.
21C Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose aR = a and y
R = 0, i.e. the regulator's loss function is identical to social
losses. Then the denition of y






a2 + aR2 =
a2y
a2 + ~ a2:
This is equivalent to (39), which guarantees an optimal choice of y
av. Hence the optimal
choice of a, aR, y, and y
R is consistent with aR = ~ a and yR = 0, i.e. with a bank
regulator sharing the preferences of society. 
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